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1. Introduction
Many crucial environmental problems may be considered social 
dilemmas. Every time the access to an exhaustible resource is shared 
between multiple individual or collective actors we are potentially facing a 
social dilemma, where the most profitable individual behavior does not 
lead to the best collective payoff. Often social dilemmas emerge when 
people share access to resources and are thus somehow competing in the 
appropriation process of the common properties. They are situations “in 
which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. That is, 
individually reasonable behavior leads to a situation in which everyone is 
worse off than they might have been otherwise” (Kollock 1998, 183). These 
situations are especially concerning because, along with leading to behavior 
which ultimately brings negative consequences for all the individuals, they 
also have extremely negative consequences on the resources themselves. 
As can easily be imagined, these premises can be found in climate change 
issues, sustainable management of marine environments, forests, energy 
management and a wide range of other circumstances. As the challenges 
posed by the ecosystems increase worldwide, knowing how social actors 
react to bindings and incentives is crucial to the development of policies that 
stimulate cooperation and virtuous behavior. Moreover, to be able to 
understand how individuals who face changes in their ecosystems would 
react to such changes, it is imperative to recognize which are the 
situational properties influencing their behavior even in relatively stable 
conditions. This may contribute to the formulation and hopefully to the 
introduction in advance of policies that could, at least, mitigate the dangers 
that decreasing resources would pose in such environments. 
The experimental approach to the set of problems in the commons allows 
for testing hypotheses under controlled conditions and even if, especially 
for laboratory experiments, the results lack the external validity necessary 
for extending the results to real-world populations, they are very effective in 
testing and developing theories (Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom 2010). 
Traditional economic approaches towards this class of problems, based on 
the rational-choice model of actors, lead to the conclusion that the most 
probable result of these processes is the well-known ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ as 
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predicted by Hardin (1968). Evidence from case studies, field experiments and 
laboratory experiments, on the other hand, suggest that this is neither the only 
nor the most common outcome of the social dilemmas (e.g. Ostrom 1998). 
This paper will review some important findings among the existing literature 
about social dilemmas with a particular focus on the theoretical work as well as 
the findings coming from laboratory experiments. 
2. Public Goods and Common-Pool Resources
The particular class of problems described in the introduction are often 
modeled either as a common-pool resource dilemma or as a public good 
dilemma. Traditionally a common-pool resource dilemma, when created in 
experimental conditions, consists in a game in which a common resource may 
be accessed by multiple players. Collecting some of the resource is beneficial for 
the harvesting player, and is the only way for him to obtain a payoff, but it 
reduces the amount of the resource available to the other players. A public good 
dilemma, instead, is modeled after a situation in which the subjects have money 
in a personal account. Contributions from their personal account to a public 
good are multiplied by a certain factor and then redistributed equally among all 
the players. The main difference between these two types of dilemmas lies in 
the rivalry of consumption. While the public good’s benefits in principle can be 
enjoyed by any number of individuals, the common-pool resource is limited and 
thus any individual using it is deducting some kind of good from the collectivity 
(see e.g. Ostrom 1994). In the CPR games, the participants have to deal mainly 
with an appropriation problem, while in PG games the main issue is provision. 
Despite these considerations, many authors treat both dilemmas as similar, if 
not equivalent, with the only difference lying in diverse representations of the 
same problem. Indeed, the similarities are clear – both dilemmas can be 
reduced to a prisoner’s dilemma game – but while these two games are 
equivalent under the Homo Oeconomicus assumption, they are treated in 
substantially different ways in real-world situations. The most evident reason, 
as stated by Gintis (2000) is that the status quo is essentially the opposite: in 
the public good class of games it consists in keeping all of the money in one’s 
private account, meaning no cooperation at all. On the contrary, in the common-
pool resource games the status quo is not using the resource at all, which is the 
most cooperative behavior.  An experimental study from Apesteguia and Meier-
Rigaud (2006) suggests also that, while the contributions in the two games tend 
to be statistically different, there are still strong behavioral similarities. In both 
cases (in a non-framed standard game, i.e. where the players can’t communicate 
and there is no punishment for noncooperators or reward for cooperators) the 
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players’ average contributions start close to the Pareto optimum1 and tend to 
move towards the Nash equilibrium2 over time. 
3. Decision-Making Theory
Analyzing the dilemmas using expected utility theory, the prediction would be, 
contrary to what is usually found in experiments, that the players try to 
maximize their income by behaving according to rational assumptions. The 
expected utility theory is the most used paradigm for decision-making in 
economics, and stems from the rational choice theory, which assumes that 
people optimize their decisions in a self-interested way. Both of these theories 
include some assumptions on the behavior of individuals, leading to the 
definition of a homo oeconomicus, which is a portrayal of humans as completely 
and consistently rational decision-makers, who pursue their self-interest. In 
practical terms, assuming rational actors, and thus embracing the rational 
choice model of actor, coincides with accepting the expected utility theory as a 
description of the decision method of the actors. An in-depth analysis of the 
expected utility theory in particular, and of the rational choice theory in general, 
is out of the scope of this article, however it is important to note that, based on 
them, cooperation in most of the common resources problems would never 
happen, and most resource users would act according to the Nash equilibrium. 
The presence of cooperation in social dilemmas would be explained only by 
considering it an error or the result of confusion. Andreoni (1995) tested this 
hypothesis, revealing that half of the analyzed cooperators in the sample were 
not confused about incentives, understood free-riding, but instead chose to 
cooperate due to preferences for kindness and cooperative behavior. Andreoni’s 
work is not the first to suggest that the expected utility theory is often unable to 
provide a reasonable estimate of people’s behavior. As mentioned by Henrich, 
Boyd et al. (2005, 3), “Literally hundreds of experiments in dozens of countries 
using a variety of game structures and experimental protocols suggest that in 
addition to their own material payoffs, subjects care about fairness and 
reciprocity, are willing to change the distribution of material outcomes among 
others at a personal cost to themselves, and rewards those who act in a 
prosocial manner”. It is clear, then, that the expected utility theory, as it is, is not 
1 The Pareto optimum, or Pareto efficiency, is defined as a situation where, given a group 
of people, it is impossible to improve the situation of an individual without worsening 
the situation for another individual. In other terms, it is the optimal allocation of 
resources. 
2 The Nash equilibrium is a concept in game theory in which no individual, knowing the 
other individuals’ choices, has any incentive in changing its own strategy. In Common-
Pool resource problems, the Nash equilibrium is often analogous to a non-cooperative 
strategy, where all the resource users use the resource as much as it is economically 
advantageous to them. 
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a good predictor of choice behavior in the commons and in many other complex 
decision environments, given that it is not able to capture many issues of the 
decision-making process. Of course, this does not allow us to ignore the 
usefulness of this theory altogether, but it limits its adoption as a predictive tool. 
Many attempts have been made to find a more efficient human decision 
theory, both related to social dilemmas and to decision processes in general. 
Despite the large amount of empirical studies, a widely accepted theory of 
decision making in social dilemmas still does not exist (Weber, Kopelmann & 
Messick 2004). However, by looking at the results of these studies, we can infer 
that people seem to react also to changes in the situation that are not explained 
by standard economic theory (i.e. to non-economic incentives). 
Ostrom’s approach to the problem is based on an analysis strongly rooted in 
noncooperative game theory. The experimental and real-world evidence 
suggests that, in an environment without communication, norms and sanctions, 
the predictions derived from such theoretical models are close to the aggregate 
behavior observed. On the other hand it is shown that, at an individual level, 
behavior does not conform to predictions, but has some regularities that could 
be a consequence of the heuristics adopted (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker 1994). 
It is anyways made clear that the assumption of rationality in the 
noncooperative games is intended to be a powerful tool to compare predictions 
and results, and not a description of the actual decision processes. In other 
words, while rational choice theory and the concept of expected utility as the 
main driver of human decisions can be extremely useful in order to build 
predictions and hypotheses, it is not a good descriptive tool.  At the same time, 
no other decision theories proved to be as effective in predicting behavior on 
very large scale, and no other decision theory translates as well into 
mathematical models, making it the most broadly-embraced approach for both 
its efficacy, and ease of application to a wide array of fields. 
Figure 1. The Appropriateness Framework (Weber, Kopelmann, & Messick, 2004) 
In order to obtain an alternative model able to provide a more accurate 
description March (1994) suggests a framework to understand individual 
choice that takes into account the aforementioned discrepancies and tries to 
explain them. The “logic of appropriateness”, contrasting with rational choice 
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models, tries to focus on the social nature of the dilemmas. The actors, according 
to this framework, choose rules of behavior that are both depending on their 
personal preferences and on the situation in which they are involved, as can be 
seen in Figure 1. The properties of the situation may also be addressed as the 
framing of the situation. The decision maker interprets those properties and 
comes up with a definition of the situation. Then, he chooses a rule to use in the 
decision process, which he believes is the appropriate rule for the situation in 
which he finds himself. It is worth stating already that, even if the behavior is 
not assimilable to the one expected from a rational actor, it still reacts, in a 
significant way, to economic factors. This is shown e.g. by Croson et al. (2000), 
who found out that a positive variation of the value of the public good, in 
comparison to the value of the private good necessary to provide it, enhances 
the chances of cooperative attitudes. This suggests that the actual economic 
factors of the situation, other than somehow being computed by the actors, also 
play a part in the choice of the rule that he will be using. 
4. Rules of Thumb
Recent research in behavioral economics and social psychology suggests that 
decision makers tend to adopt rules of thumb or heuristics rather than 
maximizing the potential outcomes (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Brandsta tter, 
Gigerenzer & Hertwig 2006). This means that, instead of acting according to the 
rational choice theory, they do not tend to consider the decisions they face in 
strict mathematical terms, and choose the alternative that allegedly allows them 
to maximize their utility, but instead they adopt less cognitively demanding 
decision processes (e.g. choosing the option that they perceive as the most 
preferred by their peers, or choose one option that they chose already in the 
past). Extensive research has been conducted with the objective of 
understanding the actual decisional processes and rules adopted in complex 
and uncertain contexts, encompassing Simon’s work on bounded rationality, 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and Gigerenzer’s fast and frugal 
heuristics (see, e.g., Simon 1983, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Gigerenzer 2008). 
Simon (1955) postulated that the discrepancies observed between the real-
world scenarios and the outcomes expected by the rational choice theory are 
explained by limits in time availability, information availability, and cognitive 
limitations of the decision-makers. Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory 
(1979), expanded on Simon’s considerations, introducing the idea that 
cognitive and situational limitations are not enough to account for the 
substantial differences between observed behavior and the expected utility 
theory, and thus, even though still based on it, the prospect theory introduces 
new concepts, such as risk aversion, certainty effects, and decision weights 
instead of probabilities, and considers them not as limitations, but as intrinsic 
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properties of decision-makers. Finally Gigerenzer (1996) introduced the 
concept of heuristics, suggesting that rationality is an adaptive tool, and instead 
of assuming that decision-makers act accordingly to the expected utility theory, 
but with biases and limitations, scholars should instead consider that decisions 
are made following a multitude of heuristics, or simple decision rules, whose 
outcomes may, sometimes, lead to the same results. For the purpose of this 
work, we can infer that focusing on the outcomes of the use of a rule is often a 
good indicator of the rule that was used in collective dilemmas, on the micro 
level (i.e., if a resource was shared equally by its direct users, most likely they 
deemed a heuristic that led them to share it equally the most appropriate for 
the situation).  The rule adopted is, as a matter of fact, heavily involved with 
what the actor thinks is the appropriate outcome of the decision, as the 
outcomes of framed experiments suggest. If the individual considers the equal 
sharing of the resource to be the right outcome in a common-pool resource 
game with four players, then he will probably adopt the rule of equality as a 
decision heuristic, and take possession of one fourth of the resource (see e.g. 
Samuelson & Allison 1994). Furthermore, as stated by El-Gamal and Grether 
(1995), the hypothesis of a relative homogeneity between actors’s decision 
rules does not find enough support. The authors conducted a set of experiments 
in order to verify if it is reasonable to state that generally, in the same type of 
task, all the participants tend to adopt the same decision rules. Their results 
suggest that it is reasonable to assume that in any given situation, different 
subjects might rely on different decision rules, and they might also change them 
depending on the outcome, meaning that, even in the same exact situation, we 
cannot reasonably expect different people to adopt the same behavior. 
Gunnthorsdottir, Houser and McCabe´s (2007) research, based on a Public Good 
experiment, suggests that a subject’s initial public contribution is a useful 
measure of cooperative disposition. This is an important finding and proves that 
it is often useful to categorize the subjects depending on their attitude towards 
cooperation, since their behavior is in many cases consistent between various 
games. For the purpose of analysis and experimental set-up, the most 
commonly used differentiation is between free-riders and cooperators. The 
latter category is often split into various types of contributors depending on 
what conditions lead them to adopt cooperative behaviors. One of the most 
common classifications, proposed by Fischbacher, Ga chter, and Fehr (2001), 
consists of conditional cooperators, who cooperate if others cooperate, triangle 
contributors, who increase their contributions depending on other subjects’ 
contributions up to a certain level, after which they start to contribute less, and 
other contributors, who do not fit in any of these two categories, but are not 
either pure free-riders. 
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5. Framing and Incentives
5.1 Communication 
Communication has been found to be an important incentive for cooperation in 
many experiments. Brosig, Weimann and Ockenfells (2003) tested the influence 
of communication and communication media by conducting seven Public Goods 
experiments, allowing for different communication media. Their results show 
that, while people in social dilemmas use communication as a tool to coordinate 
their efforts, the outcomes strongly depend on the communication medium. 
Also, even if all types of communication have a positive effect on cooperation 
levels, face-to-face communication seems to be the only one to produce, in the 
end, both high cooperation levels and high stability of such levels. 
Janssen et al. (2010), used an artificial experimental environment to consider 
also spatial and temporal dynamics, to recreate the dynamic environment in 
which the dilemmas occur in real life situations. In this case it is again verified 
with high levels of significance that communication helps subjects to achieve 
better final payoffs and to manage a CPR more efficiently. This is a further 
confirmation that communication between actors is beneficial, also with 
dynamic resources. 
Another important distinction is whether communication is allowed on a 
repeated basis or if it is only a one-shot, pre-play coordination mechanism. As 
noted by Ostrom (1992), even if the subjects can communicate, the game 
equilibria remain the same and should not, then, make a difference in the 
outcomes for rational individuals, if we assume them as strictly rational in a 
traditional sense. This is because, according to the expected utility theory, 
communication without the means to introduce punishment or other binding 
agreements should not have an effect. The results, on the other hand, suggest 
that communication may push individuals to adopt decision rules more 
adherent to the social aspects of the dilemmas and thus to more cooperative 
behavior. 
As shown experimentally by Hacket, Schlager and Walker (1994), 
communication may also be an effective mechanism to promote efficient 
resource use in more complex decision environments, such as when there is 
heterogeneity between subjects. The adopted rules may differ, ranging from 
equal sharing of the resource, to equal final outcomes for the participants, but 
the increase in efficiency in the management of the common resource is 
constant throughout the treatments observed. An interesting addition to this 
topic is brought forward by Margreiter, Sutter and Dittrich (2005), who verify 
that heterogeneity could facilitate or impede coordination when the actors 
could manage a CPR, by voting on appropriation rules. The outcome of this 
research is that, when allowed to vote, homogeneity leads to more efficient 
groups, but after a learning process the efficiency levels in heterogeneous 
groups tend to get closer to the homogeneous ones. These findings support the 
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assumption that, also in complex choices, most forms of communication may 
lead to efficient management and help subjects to overcome other obstacles to 
efficient resource use. Findings consistent with this assumption are also found 
in experiments on public good (see for example Tavoni et al., 2011), and 
generally confirm that also in that class of social dilemmas communication 
increases cooperation dramatically. 
5.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty on the properties of the resource or of the good to be provided has 
is generally found to be an obstacle to cooperation in social dilemmas. Budescu, 
Rapoport and Suleiman (1990) tested this hypothesis in a common-pool 
resource game. When uncertainty about the size of the resource was introduced 
the amount of tokens harvested by each player increased. This effect, according 
to the authors, seems to be generated by a tendency to overestimate the 
resource size when it is not known. Dannenberg, Lo schel, Paolacci, Reif and 
Tavoni (2011) obtained similar results in a Public Goods game that tested the 
effect of both risk and ambiguity relative to the amount of tokens necessary to 
provide the public good. The results support the hypothesis that uncertainty in 
both forms is a negative incentive for subjects and, in absence of trust between 
them, leads to failure in cooperation. A potential explanation is that, in 
conditions of uncertainty, the actors tend to rely on the behavior of their peers, 
thus acting as conditional cooperators. Anyway, early action and trust between 
the subjects can influence them to cooperate more in this situation. The 
importance of trust in mitigating the negative effect of uncertainty is confirmed 
by Wit and Wilke (1998). In a Public Goods experiment they verified that a 
reduction in cooperation occurs, under uncertainty, only if it is accompanied by 
high social uncertainty too. In this case, when the range of the previous 
contributions of the other participants, communicated by the experimenters to 
the subjects, was high, the chance of cooperative behavior decreased. On the 
other hand, when the range was low, there was no significant difference 
between the treatments with or without environmental uncertainty. 
However, findings contradicting the previous evidence are shown by McAllister, 
Tisdell, Reeson, and Gordon (2011). In an experiment modeling the livestock 
mobility in semiarid systems the authors found out that, when subjects find it 
very important to create and maintain long-time relationships, they might 
adopt cooperative strategies. As a conclusion, exogenous variability and 
uncertainty may also trigger cooperative strategies. Once again, the context may 
play a crucial role in the rule selection process of the individuals. 
5.3 Punishment and reward 
Punishments and rewards in common-pool resources and public goods have 
been tested as incentives for cooperation, as the results could be clearly very 
useful in developing policies. Both interventions may be of endogenous or 
exogenous nature. So far experimental results (e.g. by Sutter, Haigner & Kocher 
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2010) suggest that endogenous forms of intervention may enhance cooperation 
more than the exogenous forms, at least for what concerns punishments. 
Another consideration is that often, in experimental settings, endogenous 
punishment involves a cost, which has to be paid by a subject in order to punish 
a noncooperator. It has been shown (e.g. Ostrom 1994, Rockenbach & Milinski 
2006) that costly, endogenous punishment tends to be used by actors, contrary 
to what rational-choice approaches would predict. The subjects are willing to 
pay to be able to punish non-cooperators, even if this is clearly going to lower 
their personal, final payoff. This leads to results that, in baseline experiments 
without communication between actors, are not far from the Nash equilibrium. 
On the other hand punishment, if coupled with the possibility of communication 
between the actors, can even enhance the cooperative behavior and move the 
outcomes closer to the Pareto-optimum. As shown by Ostrom (1992), a costly 
sanctioning system without communication can even reduce net wield, while 
the most efficient sanctioning system is the one that allows subjects not only to 
communicate, but also to choose if they would like to have the possibility of 
punishment and how should this punishment work. The experiments 
conducted show that in this last option the defection rate from the agreements 
between the participants is extremely low. 
Milinski, Semmann and Krambeck (2006) in a laboratory experiment, 
debated instead of the effects of rewards, linked to the reputation of the 
subjects, on the cooperation in a public good game. As can be expected, the 
results show that there’s a huge difference in the reactions of a subject to 
rewards or punishments. Alternating an indirect reciprocity game and a Public 
Good game in which the reputation of the actors was common knowledge they 
found out that, as long as a reward for cooperation is expected, the management 
of the common resource – in this case the public good – is more efficient and the 
net wield of the participants increases. 
It is also worth noting that, relating to this, Andreoni (1995) shows that a 
positive framing, ceteris paribus, leads to better results than a negative framing. 
In his work, he conducted two sets of Public Good experiments, with opposite 
framing. In the first case, the subjects are contributing to a public good with 
their private money, while in the second experiment they may use public money 
to purchase private goods for them. The incentives and values are the same, but 
the participants have shown more cooperative attitudes when the problem is 
presented as a positive externality rather than a negative externality. This may 
suggest also the hypothesis that a rewards system may be a better choice than 
a sanctioning system in the management of the Commons. For now, 
experimental evidence doesn’t confirm this hypothesis. In the aforementioned 
work Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010), found that, while if able to choose 
subjects in Public Goods games opt for rewards instead of punishment, the 
latter intervention is more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. 
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5.4 Scarcity 
Resource stock levels in common-pools, as noted by Blanco, Lopez and 
Villamayor-Toma s (2011), have received little attention by academic research, 
which have delivered inconclusive results as of yet. The field experiment 
conducted by the authors consisted of a Common-pool resource game, with 
exogenously changing resource levels. According to the results, subjects that 
find themselves in a situation of extreme scarcity tend to increase 
appropriation, leading to even worse conditions for the resource. On the same 
topic contrasting results have been obtained by Ose s-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau 
(2007): the conclusion of their laboratory experiment, whose objective was to 
estimate agents’ concern for resource scarcity is that, as the resource becomes 
scarcer, the appropriation level tends to decrease. They state, then, that the 
concern for scarcity might, in the end, enhance resource preservation. Based on 
this last model Blanco, Lopez, and Villamayor-Toma s (2015) developed a field 
experiment in a Colombian watershed where, in conditions of extreme scarcity, 
they observed the resource users increasing their consumption. All these 
results support a hypothesis first suggested in 2009 by Ostrom. In the article 
the author stated that, based on field observations, before investing in self-
organization the resource users need to observe some type of scarcity. In other 
words, only having experienced scarcity may lead them to change their behavior 
in order to preserve the resource. This happens, though, through a curvilinear 
effect: Conditions of moderate scarcity lead to less harvesting, while extreme 
conditions of scarcity lead to overuse and, possibly to the extinction of the 
resource. One of the main issues when talking about scarcity in natural 
resources is for sure the big difference between ecosystems in terms of ability 
to cope with the disturbances, and thus generalizing observations that apply to 
different resources is an especially difficult task (see, e.g., Folke  . 2004). A 
very important aspect, finally, is that knowledge of the behavior and dynamics 
of the resource are also crucial in terms of influencing the users’ decision 
processes. As stated by Schill, Lindahl, and Cre pin (2015), the likelihood of a 
regime shift, a sudden and potentially permanent change that modifies the 
resource substantially, influences the resource users’ collection patterns, so that 
the menace of a future change can lead them to develop more cooperative 
agreements that, ultimately, can lead to more sustainable harvesting processes. 
More conclusions on this aspect will be drawn in the conclusion, but it is 
important to underline already that all these aspects are strongly tied to a deep 
knowledge of the resource, of its dynamics and of its current status. In other 
words, scarcity is indeed a measurable aspect, but it would be unsafe to assume 
that the resource users receive an immediate feedback. Therefore, it is also 
important to make sure that a change in behavior of the resource users can be 
expected only in those cases in which they are aware of a potential situation of 
scarcity or of whatsoever danger it might be in. 
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5.5 Group size 
As stated by Ostrom (2002), the effect of group size on cooperation in social 
dilemmas is still not clearly understood, and the existing evidence is 
contradicting. Both negative effects of group size on the frequency of 
cooperative strategies and no effects at all have been found in both laboratory 
and field situations. One of the plausible reasons is that, as group size increases, 
other aspects of the situations are also modified. 
The findings of Allison, McQueen, Schaerfl and Lynn (1992) are a clear example 
of the complexity of the effects of group size. They verified with a set of 
experiments two distinct aspects: the difference between a partitioned (solid 
blocks) and a non-partitioned resource (sand), and the group size. In this case, 
as the number of members of the group increased, the cooperation efforts of the 
subjects tended to decrease in presence of a non-partitioned resource, while 
there was no significant group size effect with a partitioned resource. 
5.6 Further aspects 
Other aspects of social dilemmas have been tested. As stated by Marwell and 
Ames (1980) the behavior in a public goods game is resilient to different aspects 
and incentives. The presence or absence of a provision point, the experience of 
the participants and, to some extents, the amount of money at stake does not 
influence subjects in a radical way in the experiments conducted by the authors. 
The high stakes have somehow proven to be the strongest of the three aspects 
analyzed, but not even a fivefold increase in the money at stake was enough to 
radically change the behavior. Their findings suggest that further increasing the 
sums may lead to a behavior closest to the one foreseen by the rational-choice 
theory. Following this suggestion, we can infer that the behavior in public goods 
games is resilient to many properties, and thus many of them have to assume 
extremely high values to influence the subjects. 
6. Conclusion
As already stated, there are many aspects in social dilemmas that influence their
outcomes and may determine if cooperative behaviors will emerge or not.
Clearly, experimental efforts are useful to disentangle the different traits that, in
real-world situations, determine the final use of resources. Anyway, aspects
which are specific to the environment the resource is in (e.g. ecological and
geographical properties of the area) are still expected to play a significant role.
At the same time, also cultural and social properties of the groups, which may
be hard to test in experimental settings, may drastically influence the
inclinations. Another central point is that every social dilemma, while having
similar bases, is different. As shown in this review often these dilemmas are
modeled after Public Good games or Common Pool Resource games. This review
tried to encompass both classes of games without focusing separately on the
different types of dilemmas for two main reasons. The first is that the effects on
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cooperation of different properties tend to be consistent in all types of dilemma 
in their effects. The second reason is that being able to generalize which 
properties might favor cooperation, regardless of the particular aspect of the 
situation, is indeed a valid objective to pursue. 
While this review does not plan to provide exhaustive policy suggestions, but 
instead aims at highlighting some aspects of the social dilemmas that have been 
empirically proven to be pivotal in the emergence and sustenance of 
cooperation among resource users, it is nevertheless important to emphasize 
where these aspects could play a role in policy development. The first 
conclusion that can be drawn from previous studies is, surely, that a general 
strategy cannot and should not be developed. The inherently different social, 
ecological, political, and economic characteristics of each social-ecological 
system call for very different approaches. Nevertheless, we can infer that 
several aspects should be kept in consideration in almost every case. First of all, 
a wide body of evidence suggests that communication between the resource 
users should be fostered as much as possible. This can lead to better 
coordination, cooperation between the actors and, ultimately, a better 
management of the resource. Fostering communication among the users can 
also give birth to informal forms of monitoring of the resource use, that appear 
to be crucial in those cases where institutions are not present, unwilling, or not 
able to develop a formalized monitoring system (see, e.g., Yami, Vogl & Hauser 
2009). Furthermore, even if, to our knowledge, it has not yet tested empirically 
as of yet, communication might, in some cases, help in the diffusion of 
information on the resource, potentially reducing uncertainty and allowing all 
the users to obtain the same information on the status and dynamics of the 
resource. This is of particular interest because many studies observed negative 
effects of uncertainty – regarding both the resource’s and the other users’ 
behavior – on the emergence of cooperative strategies. As already mentioned, 
though, some exceptions are possible (McAllister, Tisdell, Reeson & Gordon 
2011, mentioned in Paragraph 5.2), which reminds us of the need to develop 
different policy strategies tailored on the different social, ecological, and 
political environments. 
Monitoring and punishment have been shown to be useful in terms of 
maintaining cooperation among the resource users. Rewards, as opposed to 
forms of punishment, have been suggested to be more effective in the long term 
(Andreoni 1995, and Sutter, Haigner & Kocher 2010). However, when thinking 
about policy interventions, it is useful to remember that giving rewards is often 
a more difficult process for institutions that might require, for this, resources 
that are not available or cannot be easily (re)allocated. Implementing 
punishments for resource users that do not comply with present rules can then 
be an alternative, especially in those cases where an infrastructure is already 
present, i.e. when a monitoring system is already in act. 
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Finally, the studies on research scarcity suggest that it is important, for the 
users, to be informed both on the resource’s dynamics, and on possible 
thresholds and risks that could lead to regime shifts or generally to a lower 
productivity of the resource. This can lead to higher rates of compliance with 
the rules, and as a deterrent to short-sighted harvesting behavior. Previous 
experience with scarcity events, while not a phenomenon that can be controlled 
by policy-makers, has also been suggested, by previous research, as a possible 
positive factor in the emergence of cooperative behavior. This once again 
stresses the importance of communication and information transmission 
among the users. 
As a conclusion to this review, it is important to highlight that, while the 
insight coming from experimental research in environmental economic has 
been able to pinpoint some very relevant aspects to the management of the 
Commons, which should be considered when developing policies, it is also 
crucial to remember that, as stated by Ostmann (1998, 119): 
There are important categorical differences between the researcher’s model 
of a common, the real world phenomenon, and the experimental situation that 
the subjects have to deal with. Acknowledging these differences we have to 
admit that no direct conclusions (...) can be drawn from experimental results. 
This strong statement raises a very critical point, and reminds us that each 
approach, and in particular the experimental approach, comes with trade-offs. 
Researchers, and policy-makers to an even high degree, should always be very 
wary of extending results to a field, situation, environment, or society different 
from the ones they were obtained in. Undeniably, then, the high degree of 
complexity of each and every real-world scenario will need critical thinking, in-
depth analysis, and reliance on multiple methods and approaches to develop 
effective strategies. 
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Social Dilemmas in Environmental Economics: A review 
Abstract. 
Many crucial environmental issues lead to social dilemmas, in which the 
personally optimal solution, and the socially optimal solution diverge. Finding 
a solution to this dilemma is extremely important to allow a good and 
sustainable management of many exhaustible natural resources. This is 
especially true when the resource users need to develop collectively a set of 
rules or practices, and the institutions are unable to provide, or enforce, 
effective regulations. A few examples are forests, and fisheries, but also carbon 
emissions. This review presents a selected number of results coming from field 
observations, laboratory experiments, and theoretical work, which pinpoint 
some of the more crucial aspects of these decision environments. Knowing 
which incentives and situational aspects may motivate resource users to adopt 
a more or less cooperative behavior can potentially be of pivotal importance to 
develop effective policies and regulations. At the same time, the research we 
present is also of great interest for any diagnostic or explorative study that aims 
to study direct resource users, and their development of cooperative attitudes 
and practices. 
Keywords: Decision theory, environmental economics, social dilemmas, 
resources, experiments. 
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